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Epistemic	Loops	and	Measurement	Realism	
Alistair	M.	C.	Isaac	
	
Abstract	
Recent	philosophy	of	measurement	has	emphasized	the	existence	of	both	
diachronic	and	synchronic	“loops,”	or	feedback	processes,	in	the	epistemic	
achievements	of	measurement.		A	widespread	response	has	been	to	conclude	
that	measurement	outcomes	do	not	convey	interest-independent	facts	about	
the	world,	and	that	only	a	coherentist	epistemology	of	measurement	is	viable.		
In	contrast,	I	argue	that	a	form	of	measurement	realism	is	consistent	with	
these	results.		The	insight	is	that	antecedent	structure	in	measuring	spaces	
constrains	our	empirical	procedures	such	that	successful	measurement	
conveys	a	limited,	but	veridical	knowledge	of	“fixed	points,”	or	stable,	interest-
independent	features	of	the	world.	
	
	
§1		Introduction	
	
Recent	philosophy	of	measurement	has	employed	detailed	case	studies	to	
highlight	the	complex,	iterative	process	by	which	measurement	practices	are	
refined.		Typically,	these	examples	are	taken	to	support	some	form	of	epistemic	
coherentism,	on	which	the	validation	of	measurement	procedures,	and	thus	their	
epistemic	import,	is	irreducibly	infected	by	the	contingent	history	of	their	
development	in	aid	of	human	interests.		This	coherentism	in	turn	undermines	
measurement	realism,	the	view	that	outcomes	of	successful	measurement	
practices	veridically	represent	objective	(i.e.	interest-independent)	features	of	
the	world.		For	instance,	van	Fraassen	(2008)	takes	the	historical	contingency	of	
measurement	practice	to	support	empiricism,	and	Chang	(2012)	argues	that	only	
a	pragmatic,	interest-relative	“realism”	about	measurement	outcomes	is	
plausible,	not	one	which	interprets	them	as	corresponding	to	objective	features	
in	the	world.		More	generally,	Tal	(2013)	identifies	coherentism	as	a	major	trend	
within	contemporary	philosophy	of	measurement.	
	 I	argue	that	the	iterative	and	coherentist	features	of	measurement	
practice	these	authors	rightly	emphasize	are	nevertheless	consistent	with	
realism	about	measurement	outcomes.		Nevertheless,	my	position	contrasts	
significantly	with	that	of	other	measurement	realists,	such	as	Byerly	and	Lazara	
(1973)	or	Michell	(2005),	who	take	measurement	realism	to	be	continuous	with		
global	scientific	realism.		On	their	view,	measurement	realism	is	a	stronger	
position	than	traditional	realism,	imputing	reality	not	only	to	theoretical	objects	
and	laws,	but	also	to	their	quantitative	character.		The	view	defended	here	
reverses	this	priority,	articulating	a	realism	about	measurement	outcomes	
weaker	than	traditional	realism.		In	particular,	I	argue	that	the	convergent	
assignment	of	increasingly	precise	values	that	constitutes	successful	
measurement	serves	as	incontrovertible	evidence	for	fixed	points	in	the	world	—	
features	or	events	standing	in	stable	quantitative	relationships	—	even	though	
the	evidence	it	provides	for	any	non-numerical	theoretical	description	of	these	
points	is	defeasible.		The	insight	here	is	that	measurement	is	more	evidentially	
demanding	than	traditional	confirmation,	i.e.	it	requires	a	greater	contribution	
from	the	interest-independent	world	to	succeed	than	mere	qualitative	
experiments.		I	argue	that	this	greater	evidential	demand	is	a	consequence	of	the	
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antecedent	numerical	structure	in	which	measurement	outcomes	are	
represented.		This	antecedent	structure	blocks	the	possibility	of	gerrymandered	
categories	that	crosscut	the	joints	of	nature.		Consequently,	successful	
measurement	constitutes	a	substantive	enough	epistemic	achievement	that	we	
may	legitimately	“factor	out”	the	contribution	to	success	made	by	human	
interests,	and	accept	the	outcome	as	representing	an	objective	feature	of	the	
world.			
	 After	surveying	the	motivations	for	measurement	coherentism,	I	
elaborate	on	the	notion	of	“successful”	measurement,	and	why	it	poses	a	
challenge	to	coherentism.		The	paper	concludes	with	a	more	careful	articulation	
of	the	distinctive	features	of	fixed	point	realism.	
	
§2	Epistemic	Loops	in	Measurement	Practice	
	
	 Contemporary	measurement	coherentism	is	motivated	by	two	types	of	
case	study,	each	identifying	a	different	kind	of	epistemic	“loop,”	or	feedback	
process	driving	knowledge	formation.		Chang	and	van	Fraassen	emphasize	
diachronic	examples	of	epistemic	iteration,	where	the	feedback	process	extends	
over	several	stages	of	mutual	influence	between	theory	change	and	refinement	
of	measurement	practice.		A	different	kind	of	epistemic	loop	has	been	discussed	
by	Tal	and	metrologist	Mari,	who	highlight	the	role	of	models	in	the	calibration	
of	measurement	instruments	and	the	assignment	of	quantity	values,	illustrating	
a	synchronic	epistemic	interdependence	between	theory	and	measurement.	
	
§2.1	Epistemic	Iteration	
	
	 Chang	(2004)	defines	epistemic	iteration	as	“a	process	in	which	successive	
stages	of	knowledge,	each	building	on	the	preceding	one,	are	created	in	order	to	
enhance	the	achievement	of	certain	epistemic	goals”	(45).		He	takes	this	process	
to	support	a	“progressive	coherentism”:	on	the	one	hand,	the	criteria	for	
measurement	success	are	internal	to	a	practice,	so	scientific	knowledge	does	not	
rest	on	an	independent	foundation;	on	the	other	hand,	these	internal	criteria	
may	be	used	to	evaluate	new	practices	as	improvements	or	refinements	on	their	
predecessors,	thereby	allowing	for	scientific	progress	(in	contrast	to	traditional	
coherentism,	Chang	2007).		In	the	context	of	measurement,	this	means	that	later	
measurement	practices	may	be	understood	as	in	some	sense	“better”	than	earlier	
ones,	yet	these	“epistemic	achievements”	should	not	be	cashed	out	as	greater	
degree	of	correspondence	to	quantities	in	the	world.		
	 For	instance,	thermometry	as	a	practice	begins	with	subjective	
assignments	of	relative	heat	on	the	basis	of	our	bodily	experiences.		Noticing	that	
fluids	appear	to	change	volume	in	rough	correspondence	with	these	subjective	
sensations,	one	may	construct	a	thermoscope,	or	device	allowing	comparison	of	
relative	fluid	volumes	in	different	circumstances.		Already	a	theoretical	leap	is	
required	to	identify	the	cause	of	these	changes	in	relative	volume	with	the	cause	
of	our	differing	subjective	sensations,	especially	given	the	discrepancies	between	
these	sensations	and	our	thermoscopic	readings	(e.g.	contrary	to	experience,	
caves	are	warmer	in	summer	than	they	are	in	winter).		Nevertheless,	the	move	to	
the	thermoscope	constitutes	an	epistemic	achievement,	in	the	sense	that	it	
allows	for	greater	regularity	in	the	assignment	of	relative	temperatures,	both	
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across	contexts	and	across	observers.		A	similar	pattern	is	seen	in	the	move	from	
thermoscope	to	thermometer,	which	enables	assignment	of	numbers	to	
temperatures.		Numerical	representation	constitutes	a	yet	greater	epistemic	
achievement,	insofar	as	it	allows	comparison	of	temperature	assignments	across	
devices.		Nevertheless,	this	practice	does	not	itself	guarantee	greater	veracity	of	
temperature	assignments,	since	it	rests	on	the	assumption	that	temperature	
varies	linearly	with	changes	in	the	height	of	thermometric	fluid.		But	this	
assumption	cannot	itself	be	verified,	as	that	would	require	access	to	temperature	
in	the	world	by	some	means	independent	of	thermometry.		Similar	
achievements,	(seemingly)	inextricably	entangled	with	theory,	may	be	seen	at	
each	further	stage	in	the	development	of	thermometric	practice.	
	 The	moral	of	this	case	study	is	the	historical	contingency	of	thermometry,	
and	thus	of	its	results.		At	each	stage	in	the	development	of	thermometry,	an	
advance	in	theory	was	required	to	extend	measurement	practice.		Internal	
criteria	of	consistency	and	increased	precision	in	the	assignment	of	numerical	
values	establish	the	new	practice	as	an	advance	over	the	previous	one.		Yet,	the	
application	of	these	criteria	is	not	empirically	constrained.		When	one	assumes	
that	“temperature”	(whatever	it	may	be)	varies	linearly	with	changes	in	the	
height	of	the	indicator	column	in	an	air	thermometer,	one	is	making	an	
assumption	both	necessary	for	measurement	progress	and	in	principle	non-
empirical,	since	no	independent	access	to	“temperature,”	outside	the	behavior	of	
the	very	devices	and	procedures	under	investigation,	is	possible:	“Prior	to	the	
construction	of	a	thermometer,	there	is	no	thermometer	to	settle	that	question!”	
(van	Fraassen	2008,	126,	emphasis	in	original).		Chang	(2004)	argues	that,	in	
order	to	make	sense	of	the	“progress”	exemplified	by	cases	like	these,	we	have	to	
“look	away	from	truth,”	and	appeal	only	to	historically	contingent	criteria	for	
success	(227)—“scientific	progress	…	cannot	mean	closer	approach	to	the	truth”	
(228);	“Truth,	in	the	sense	of	correspondence	to	reality,	is	beyond	our	reach”	
(Chang	2007,	20).		The	delusion	that	one	may	evaluate	the	correspondence	
between	our	assignment	of	temperatures	and	the	objective	state	of	the	world	
rests	on	the	mistaken	and	“impossible	god-like	view	in	which	nature	and	theory	
and	measurement	practice	are	all	accessed	independently	of	each	other”	(van	
Fraassen	2008,	139).		Rather,	the	only	relevant	notion	of	“truth”	for	assessing	the	
success	of	thermometry	“rests	first	and	foremost	on	coherence	with	the	rest	of	
the	system”	(Chang	2012,	242).	
	 	
§2.2	Models	and	Calibration	
	 		
	 Another	kind	of	epistemic	loop	is	found	in	synchronic	measurement	
practice,	where	models	play	a	constitutive	role	in	determining	measurement	
outcomes.		The	crucial	concept	here	is	calibration,	the	process	of	correcting	a	
measurement	device	for	inferred	discrepancies	between	its	readout	and	the	
target	value.		Calibration	is	a	necessary	feature	of	all	sophisticated	measurement,	
yet	the	process	of	calibration	illustrates	the	ineliminable	role	of	theoretical	
posits	in	the	very	assignment	of	quantity	values	in	an	act	of	measurement.		When	
measuring,	scientists	do	not	(as	one	might	naively	suppose)	read	values	directly	
from	nature,	rather	they	employ	models	of	the	interaction	between	
measurement	device	and	target	system	in	order	to	“correct”	the	readout	value	to	
a	final	assigned	value	(Mari	and	Giordani	2014).			
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	 Tal	(2014)	illustrates	this	point	through	the	example	of	the	measurement	
of	time,	in	particular	coordinated	universal	time	(UTC).	The	second	is	presently	
defined	as	9,192,631,770	periods	of	the	hyperfine	transition	between	the	two	
ground	states	of	a	caesium-133	atom	at	zero	degrees	Kelvin.1		Models	feature	at	
every	step	of	the	process	leading	from	devices	that	interact	directly	with	caesium	
atoms	to	the	UTC.		First,	it	is	impossible	to	probe	caesium	atoms	at	absolute	zero,	
so	the	enumeration	of	hyperfine	transitions	output	by	a	caesium	clock	must	be	
corrected	for	this	discrepancy.		This,	as	well	as	other	corrections,	rely	on	models	
of	the	physical	interaction	between	the	device	and	the	atom	in	order	to	infer	the	
discrepancy	between	the	actual	state	of	the	system	and	the	idealized	state	
referred	to	in	the	definition.		Caesium	clocks	are	too	complex	to	run	
continuously,	so	their	output	is	used	to	calibrate	more	mundane	atomic	clocks	
(301).		Furthermore,	the	UTC	itself	is	not	identified	with	the	output	of	any	one	
clock;	rather,	it	is	calculated	retrospectively	by	a	weighted	average	over	all	
participating	atomic	clocks,	with	weights	determined	by	the	degree	of	past	fit	
between	each	clock	and	previous	calculations	of	UTC	(302–3).			
	 The	lessons	of	this	example	are	analogous	to	those	of	epistemic	iteration:	
measurement	improvement	appears	to	rest	on	internal	standards	of	coherence	
rather	than	on	correspondence	with	external	quantities.		The	weighting	
procedure	that	leads	to	UTC,	for	instance,	“promotes	clocks	that	are	stable	
relative	to	each	other”	(304).		Success	at	achieving	this	stability	indeed	
demonstrates	“genuine	empirical	knowledge,”	but	not	knowledge	in	the	first	
instance	about	a	regularity	in	the	objective	world,	but	rather	a	regularity	“in	the	
behaviour	of	instruments”	(327).		Consequently,	it	is	a	“conceptual	mistake”	to	
think	that	“the	stability	of	measurement	standards	can	be	analysed	into	distinct	
contributions	by	humans	and	nature”	(328).		On	an	extreme	interpretation	of	
this	view,	even	computer	simulation	constitutes	a	form	of	measurement	
(Morrison	2009).		The	basic	idea	is	that,	once	we	grant	the	ineliminable	role	of	
models	in	measurement,	it	is	a	small	conceptual	step	to	accept	that	the	aspect	of	
measurement	involving	empirical	contact	with	the	world	may	be	arbitrarily	
distant	from	that	involving	modeling	(Parker	2017).	
	
§3	Achieving	Successful	Measurement	
	
For	the	remainder	of	this	paper,	I	wish	to	grant	the	basic	descriptive	features	of	
this	account:	both	diachronically	and	synchronically,	successful	measurement	
involves	epistemic	loops.		Nevertheless,	I	will	argue,	there	is	a	form	of	
measurement	realism	consistent	with	these	loops;	one	on	which	the	contingent,	
interest-relative,	and	theory-laden	aspects	of	measurement	may	indeed	be	
factored	out,	leaving	the	bare,	objective	facts	about	the	world	conveyed	by	
successful	measurement.	
																																																								
1	Arguably,	the	process	of	establishing	UTC	is	not	measurement	at	all	—	since	the	length	of	the	
second	is	defined	by	caesium-133	transitions,	it	is	not	subject	to	empirical	determination.		The	
purpose	of	the	project	Tal	examines	is	not	to	establish	a	value,	as	in	paradigmatic	cases	of	
measurement,	but	rather	to	coordinate	time-relevant	activities	across	the	globe	with	maximal	
precision.		I	set	this	concern	aside	for	the	discussion	here,	since	Tal’s	analysis	has	been	so	
influential	in	philosophy	of	measurement,	and	his	conclusions	concerning	the	model-mediation	
of	measurement	incontrovertibly	reflect	the	practices	of	metrologists.	
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	 But	what	is	“successful	measurement”?		For	the	purposes	of	discussion	
here,	I	take	measurement	to	be	any	empirical	procedure	for	assigning	points	(or	
regions)	in	a	metric	space	to	states	of	the	world,	where	a	metric	space	is	any	set	
of	elements	with	a	distance	metric	defined	over	it.		This	means,	on	the	one	hand,	
that	I	rule	out	degenerative	forms	of	“measurement”	that	simply	assign	objects	
to	categories,	or	place	them	in	an	order	(the	nominal	and	ordinal	scales	of	
Stevens	1946).		On	the	other	hand,	I	include	measurement	procedures	that	map	
states	of	the	world	into	any	geometrical	space,	not	just	the	real	line,	so	long	as	
they	have	an	assigned	distance	metric	(siding	with	Suppes,	et	al.	1989,	against	
Díez	1997);	nevertheless,	in	the	interests	of	simplicity,	I	will	refer	to	these	
outcomes	as	“numerical”	assignments,	since	they	may	be	represented	by	vectors	
of	real	numbers.		In	line	with	Krantz	et	al.	(1971),	I	take	it	that	one	can	determine	
whether	or	not	an	empirical	procedure	constitutively	requires	the	metric	
features	of	a	geometrical	space	by	analyzing	whether	these	remain	invariant	
across	permissible	transformations	over	the	mapping	into	that	space.2	
	 I	take	successful	measurement	to	exhibit	two	key	features:	convergence	
and	precision.		These	features	pose	a	significant	challenge	to	the	thoroughgoing	
coherentist.	
	 	
§3.1	Convergence	
	
Coherentists	have	emphasized	the	theory-ladenness	of	both	diachronic	and	
synchronic	aspects	of	measurement	refinement.		However,	a	hallmark	of	
sophisticated	scientific	measurement	is	its	attempt	to	factor	out	the	role	of	
theory	in	measurement	by	employing	different	theoretical	commitments	to	
measure	the	same	quantity.		A	measurement	practice	converges	when	
procedures	employing	different	theoretical	commitments	arrive	at	the	same	
outcome.	
	 For	instance,	in	the	early	20th	century,	a	wide	variety	of	phenomena	were	
investigated,	employing	distinct	methods	and	theoretical	commitments,	in	the	
attempt	to	measure	Avogadro’s	constant	NA,	the	number	of	particles	in	a	mole	of	
substance.		Perhaps	most	well-known	are	Perrin’s	experiments	on	Brownian	
motion,	which,	in	combination	with	Einstein’s	theoretical	analysis,	allowed	an	
assignment	of	value	to	NA.		However,	similar	values	were	achieved	by	radically	
different	means.		For	instance,	Millikan	was	able	to	determine	NA	by	measuring	
charge	of	the	electron	through	his	oil	drop	experiments	and	dividing	the	Faraday	
constant	(charge	of	a	mole	of	electrons)	by	his	result.		Millikan’s	measurement	
relied	on	Stokes’	theoretical	analysis	of	the	movement	of	spheres	through	a	
viscous	fluid	—	insofar	as	Brownian	motion	was	a	factor,	it	was	as	a	source	of	
noise,	not	(as	for	Perrin)	a	source	of	evidence.		Black	body	radiation	and	the	blue	
																																																								
2	For	instance,	consider	two	procedures	for	assigning	real	numbers	to	my	students.		On	the	first,	I	
assign	a	number	to	each	letter-type	with	which	a	student’s	name	begins	(e.g.	A=1,	B=3,…);	on	the	
second,	I	hold	a	meter	stick	up	to	each	student	and	note	their	height.		The	former	procedure	is	
indifferent	to	the	algebraic	structure	of	the	real	line	(letters	do	not	add	or	subtract	from	each	
other	systematically),	and	thus	metric	features	of	the	real	line	are	not	invariant	across	
alternative,	equally	permissible	assignments	of	numbers	(e.g.	A=7,	B=15,…).		The	second	does	
make	use	of	algebraic	structure	(as	heights	do	“add”	through	concatenation),	and	thus	metric	
features	remain	invariant	across	alternative	assignments	(Jamal	is	twice	the	height	of	Leslie,	
whether	their	heights	are	represented	in	inches	or	centimeters).		So,	on	the	present	definition,	
the	latter	procedure	is	measurement,	but	the	former	is	not.	
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of	the	sky	are	examples	of	other	phenomena	that,	when	combined	with	
theoretical	models	of	photon	emission	and	diffraction	respectively,	allow	
alternate	means	of	measuring	NA.		Insofar	as	these	procedures	assign	the	same	
value	to	NA,	they	converge.	
	 I	want	to	stress	that	the	point	being	made	here	is	not	the	traditional	
realist	one,	that	these	practices	provide	converging	evidence	for	the	particulate	
nature	of	matter,	whether	as	“common	cause”	(Salmon	1984)	or	most	likely	
hypothesis	(Psillos	2011).		Those	arguments	are	instances	of	abduction,	while	I	
am	interested	in	whether	a	stronger,	non-abductive	conclusion	may	be	drawn	
from	convergence.		A	better	analogy	is	with	the	discussion	of	robustness	in	the	
modeling	literature:	a	result	is	robust	if	it	is	obtained	by	a	plurality	of	models	
that	each	make	different	simplifying	assumptions	(Weisberg	2006).		The	
particulate	nature	of	matter	is	not	robust	in	this	sense	across	different	
measurement	practices,	since	it	is	assumed	by	all	of	them.		However,	the	value	of	
NA	is	robust,	since	that	value	is	not	itself	assumed,	and	is	obtained	with	a	great	
degree	of	agreement	despite	differences	in	the	assumptions	made	by	each	
measurement	practice	(and	its	supporting	models).		I	claim	that	convergence	
toward	this	value	provides	robust,	non-abductive	evidence	for	an	objective	
feature	of	the	world.	
	 This	example	is	in	no	way	exceptional:	convergent	measurement	
practices	are	rife	across	the	sciences.		Smith	and	Miyake,	for	instance,	have	
investigated	a	number	of	examples.		Thomson’s	convergent	measurements	of	the	
charge	of	the	electron	employed	a	variety	of	different	methods	and	assumptions	
(Smith	2001).		Early	attempts	to	measure	the	density	of	the	interior	of	the	earth	
likewise	assumed	a	variety	of	different	theoretical	models	(Miyake	2018).		In	
more	recent	research,	measurements	of	the	constants	that	govern	molecular	
vibration	converge	across	spectroscopy,	chemistry,	thermodynamics,	and	
femtochemistry	(Smith	and	Miyake,	manuscript).		To	pick	an	example	from	an	
entirely	different	area	of	science,	measurements	of	the	spectral	sensitivity	of	
mammalian	retinal	receptors	employing	psychophysical	methods	(extracting	
sensitivity	curves	from	behavioral	color	matching	experiments,	as	performed	by	
Helmholtz	in	the	late	19th	century)	converge	closely	with	20th	century	
physiological	methods	(detecting	rate	of	nerve	firing	in	(e.g.)	cow	retinal	tissue	
in	response	to	single	wavelength	lights,	Wandell	1995).		In	all	of	these	cases,	
“What	is	being	shown	through	the	convergence	of	these	measurements	is	that	
the	discrepancies	between	the	different	measurements	…	are	due	to	the	
particularities	of	the	models	being	used”	(Miyake,	2018,	336).		In	other	words,	
convergence	factors	out	model-sensitive	features	of	measurement;	in	order	for	it	
to	occur,	“the	empirical	world	has	to	cooperate”	(Smith	2001,	26).	
	
§3.2	Precision	
	
Traditionally,	measurement	success	was	evaluated	with	respect	to	two	features:	
accuracy	and	precision.		Accuracy	was	degree	of	approach	to	true	value,	while	
precision	was	degree	of	specificity	in	the	value	provided.		The	considerations	in	
§2	undermine	the	criterion	of	accuracy,	since	they	show	we	have	no	independent	
access	to	“true	values”	and	thus	cannot	use	them	as	standards	for	evaluating	
measurement	(Mari	2003).		Nevertheless,	we	can	still	assess	measurements	for	
precision,	since	it	may	be	defined	operationally:	a	measurement	is	precise	to	the	
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extent	that	it	returns	the	same	result	when	performed	repeatedly.		The	number	
of	significant	figures	in	a	numerical	assignment	indicates	the	degree	of	
measurement	precision,	since	these	characterize	the	size	of	the	region	within	
which	repeated	measurements	fall.	
	 Coherentists	stress	the	fact	that	increased	precision	is	a	purely	internal	
criterion	for	improving	measurement.		Here,	however,	I	want	to	stress	the	way	in	
which	increased	precision	constitutes	a	qualitatively	different,	and	more	
impressive,	epistemic	achievement	than	other	forms	of	empirical	success,	such	
as	qualitative	prediction	or	improved	coherence	of	classification.		These	
qualitative	achievements	are	subject	to	worries	about	semantic	and	theoretical	
holism:	one	may	always	succeed	in	classification,	or	correct	qualitative	
prediction,	by	suitably	redrawing	the	boundaries	of	one’s	theoretical	concepts.		
As	LaPorte	(2004)	argues,	when	faced	with	anomalies	in	the	relationship	
between	guinea	pigs	and	prototypical	rodents,	or	birds	and	dinosaurs,	scientists	
face	a	choice	whether	to	expand	or	contract	their	previous	categories	to	include	
or	exclude	perceived	outliers	(a	similar	case	is	made	by	Slater	2017	for	Pluto	and	
planethood).		Nothing	about	the	prior	conceptual	framework	itself	forces	this	
choice	one	way	or	another,	nor	do	demands	for	internal	consistency.	
	 Measurement	is	different	from	mere	categorization	precisely	because	it	
maps	states	into	a	metric	space.		The	crucial	point	to	note	here	is	that	a	metric	
space	has	antecedent	structure:	the	distances	between	points	on	the	real	line,	and	
the	algebraic	relationships	between	them,	are	fixed	before	we	employ	it	to	
represent	height	or	temperature	or	electric	charge.		This	antecedent	structure	
constrains	the	relationship	between	measurement	outcomes,	independently	
restricting	our	assessment	of	them	as	same	or	different,	or	converging	or	not,	in	
a	manner	impervious	to	ad	hoc	revision.		Increase	in	precision	occurs	when	
successive	measurement	practices	are	able	to	shrink	distances	(between	
repeated	measurements	within	each	practice)	determined	by	the	metric	of	the	
representing	space.		Thus,	the	metric	of	this	space	serves	two	functions:	(i)	it	
represents	the	distances	between	different	measured	quantities,	but	(ii)	it	also	
provides	a	directed	metric	for	improving	measurement	of	a	single	quantity,	since	
it	determines	the	distances	between	repeated	measurements	that	characterizes	
their	precision.		Consequently,	pace	van	Fraassen,	attempts	to	increase	precision	
are	empirically	constrained,	since	this	directed	metric	for	improvement	can	only	
be	satisfied	through	the	cooperation	of	nature:	if	nature	is	not	sufficiently	stable	
where	we	probe	it,	no	choice,	convention,	or	increased	coherence	can	reduce	the	
distances	between	our	repeated	attempts	to	measure	it.		Some	examples	will	
illustrate	this	point.	
	 Consider,	for	instance,	determinations	of	the	boiling	point	of	water.		
Chang	(2004,	Ch.	1)	surveys	the	sequence	of	choice	points	in	the	early	practice	of	
thermometry	leading	to	relative	stability	in	the	measurement	of	this	
temperature:	what	are	the	visual	indicators	of	boiling,	where	should	the	
thermometer	be	positioned,	what	should	be	the	shape	of	the	vessel	holding	the	
water,	its	material,	etc.3		Decisions	on	each	of	these	points	affect	the	relative	
stability	in	the	thermometric	reading,	illustrating	the	naivety	of	a	view	on	which	
																																																								
3	The	issue	here	is	the	phenomenon	of	“superheating,”	whereby	water	with	relatively	little	
dissolved	gas,	or	in	a	flask	with	very	small	surface	area,	may	be	heated	to	a	higher	temperature	
without	bubbling.	
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boiling	point	is	a	simple	phenomena	merely	waiting	to	be	observed.		
Nevertheless,	in	committing	to	represent	the	boiling	point	numerically,	
investigators	subjected	themselves	to	a	criterion	for	success	distinct	from	
coherence.		If	the	numbers	assigned	by	thermometers	within	this-shaped	vessels	
and	that-shaped	ones	differ	during	phenomenologically	similar	bubblings,	then	
the	distance	between	those	numbers	provides	a	criterion	of	difference	that	must	
be	respected	if	thermometric	practice	is	to	count	as	measurement.		Restricting	
attention	to	those	vessels	that	minimize	distances	between	numerical	outcomes	
is	thus	not	a	mere	choice,	or	gerrymandering	of	the	category	“boiling,”	since	it	is	
forced	upon	the	investigator	by	an	antecedent	metric	for	success.		
	 Likewise,	consider	again	the	determination	of	UTC	through	the	
retrospective	weighting	of	the	comparison	set	of	atomic	clocks.		For	Tal,	the	
success	of	this	procedure	is	evidence	for	stability	in	our	clocks,	but	not	for	any	
human-independent	feature	of	the	world.		Nevertheless,	UTC	is	constrained	by	
the	world	in	two	distinct	ways.		First,	through	empirical	contact	with	caesium	
atoms.		While	this	contact	is	mediated	by	models,	these	models	themselves	are	
the	result	of	convergent	measurements	of	atomic	phenomena	through	a	wide	
variety	of	means,	employing	distinct	theoretical	assumptions.		Second,	the	
distance	metric	of	the	real	line	constrains	the	assessment	of	fit	between	clocks	in	
the	set.		While	the	algorithm	that	weights	them	takes	degree	of	internal	
agreement	as	the	standard	for	higher	weighting,	the	metrical	structure	of	the	
space	in	which	relative	rates	of	the	clocks	are	assessed	ensures	relative	
agreement	cannot	be	stipulated,	fudged,	or	gerrymandered.		The	clocks	need	to	
cooperate	by	performing	stably	enough	that	they	may	be	compared	with	a	high	
degree	of	precision,	and	this	stable	point	remains	tethered	to	a	robust	regularity	
in	the	world	through	checks	with	the	convergent	behavior	of	caesium.	
	 While	UTC	is	in	some	respects	atypical	(see	footnote	1),	these	three	
features	—	internal	coordination	of	outcomes,	empirical	checks,	and	directed	
improvement	constrained	by	the	real	line	—	are	features	of	scientific	
measurement	in	general.		What	Tal’s	discussion	of	the	UTC	obscures	is	the	sheer	
number	of	empirical	checks	typically	involved,	and	the	strictness	of	the	demands	
placed	by	conformity	to	the	metric	of	improvement	the	measuring	space	
provides.		In	official	determinations	of	fundamental	physical	constants,	
convergence	is	demanded	across	all	measurement	procedures,	as	assessed	by	
the	law-governed	interrelationship	between	physical	quantities,	and	the	degree	
of	precision	achieved	illustrates	the	strictness	of	this	demand.		For	instance,	in	
late	19th	century	measurements	of	NA	by	Perrin	and	e	(charge	of	electron)	by	
Thomson,	only	2	to	3	significant	figures	were	typically	obtained	within	method,	
and	convergence	across	methods	often	only	agreed	as	to	order	of	magnitude.		By	
1911,	Millikan	was	measuring	both	e	and	NA	to	4	significant	figures,	and	
demonstrating	that	the	models	employed	to	calibrate	the	oil	drop	method	
converged	closely	with	other	aspects	of	physical	theory	(1911).		As	of	2014,	NA	
was	being	measured	at	upwards	of	9	significant	figures,	and	e	upwards	of	11	
(Mohr	et	al.	2016).4		In	each	case,	the	increase	in	precision	has	been	constrained	
by	the	antecedent	structure	of	the	real	line,	and	thus	is	not	itself	a	matter	of	mere	
convention	or	coherence.		Rather,	the	world	must	cooperate	by	remaining	
																																																								
4	It	is	expected	that	after	the	2018	26th	General	Conference	on	Weights	and	Measures,	NA	and	e	
will	be	fixed	as	constants	to	which	other	quantities	may	be	referred	during	measurement.		
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sufficiently	stable	if	such	precision	is	to	be	possible;	consequently,	precise	values	
constitute	robust	evidence	for	points	of	objective	fixity	in	the	world	revealed	
through	measurement.	
	
§4	Conclusion:	Fixed-Point	Realism	
	
Traditional	scientific	realism	rests	on	an	abductive	inference	from	observed	
empirical	success	to	presumed	underlying	causes.		Successful	measurement	may	
certainly	be	used	in	such	an	inference,	but	I	claim	here	that	it	non-abductively	
supports	a	more	modest	realism:			
	
Fixed	Point	Realism	–	values	obtained	through	successful	measurement	
veridically	represent	objective	fixed	points	in	the	world,	which	may	be	
exhaustively	characterized	by	the	pattern	of	distances	that	obtain	
between	them	in	a	metric	space.	
	
FPR	is	a	form	of	epistemic	structural	realism.		It	differs	from	traditional	realism	
insofar	as	it	claims	a	veridical	characterization	of	the	world	is	possible	
independent	of	any	particular	theoretical	description.		Our	theory	of	the	nature	
of	temperature	or	of	state	changes	may	change	radically,	yet	the	points	of	
relative	stability	characterizing,	e.g.,	boiling	point	of	water,	“absolute	zero,”	
freezing	point	of	oxygen,	etc.,	will	stay	robust	across	any	such	change,	and	that	
robustness	may	be	represented	by	their	relative	positions	within	a	numerical	
scale.			
	 FPR	differs	from	other	flavors	of	structural	realism	in	the	type	of	
structure	to	which	it	is	committed.		Structural	realists	typically	focus	on	the	rich	
mathematical	structure	of	physical	theory,	and	derivation	or	limit	relations	that	
hold	between	successive	theories,	e.g.	Newton’s	laws	are	a	limit	case	of	
relativistic	mechanics	(Worrall	1989).		FPR	commits	itself	only	to	geometric	
structure,	i.e.	the	pattern	of	relative	distances	that	obtain	between	points	of	
stability	as	represented	in	a	metric	space.		Just	as	our	theoretical	description	of	
these	stable	points	may	change,	so	may	our	mathematical	account	of	their	
relationship	—	if	new	mathematical	physics	fails	to	derive	old	equations	as	limit	
cases,	this	in	no	way	jeopardizes	the	veridicality	of	this	geometric	structure.	
	 Finally,	FPR	disagrees	with	coherentism,	insofar	as	it	asserts	that	the	
geometrical	structure	uncovered	through	acts	of	successive	measurement	
obtains	in	the	world	independent	of	our	practices.		It	does	not	deny	the	
importance	of	epistemic	loops	for	understanding	the	process	of	measurement.		
Nevertheless,	it	takes	convergence	in	measured	values	to	indicate	that	the	points	
of	stability	they	represent	obtain	independent	of	the	theoretical	commitments	
encapsulated	in	the	models	used	for	calibration.		Likewise,	it	takes	increased	
precision	to	constitute	a	criterion	for	measurement	success	over	and	above	that	
of	coherence,	one	that	is	only	realized	when	the	interest-independent	world	
cooperates	with	us	by	remaining	stable	when	we	probe	it.	
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